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1 INTRODUCTION
ONLINE social networks (OSNs) are increasingly threat-ened by social bots [2] which are software-controlled OSN
accounts that mimic human users with malicious intentions.
For example, according to a May 2012 article in Bloomberg
Businessweek,1 as many as 40% of the accounts on Facebook,
Twitter, and other popular OSNs are spammer accounts (or
social bots), and about 8% of the messages sent via social
networks are spams, approximately twice the volume of six
months ago. There have been reports on various attacks,
abuses, and manipulations based on social bots [3], such as
infiltrating Facebook [4] or Twitter [5], [6], launching spam
campaign [7]–[9], and conducting political astroturf [10], [11].
A social botnet refers to a group of social bots under the
control of a single botmaster, which collaborate to conduct
malicious behavior while mimicking the interactions among
normal OSN users to reduce their individual risk of being
detected. For example, social bots on Twitter can follow others
and retweet/answer others’ tweets. Since a skewed follow-
ing/followers (FF) ratio is a typical feature for social bots on
Twitter [12], maintaining a balanced FF ratio in the social botnet
makes it much easier for individual bots to escape detection.
Creating a social botnet is also fairly easy due to the open APIs
published by OSN providers. For example, we successfully
created a network of 1,000 accounts on Twitter with $57 to
purchase 1,000 Twitter accounts instead of manually creating
them.
Despite various studies [13]–[15] confirming the existence
of social botnets, neither have the greater danger from social
botnets been unveiled nor have the countermeasures targeted
on social botnets been proposed. In this paper, we first report
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two new social botnet attacks on Twitter, one of the most
popular OSNs with over 302M monthly active users as of June
2015 and over 500M new tweets daily. Then we propose two
defenses on the reported attacks, respectively. Our results help
understand the potentially detrimental effects of social botnets
and shed the light for Twitter and other OSNs to improve their
bot(net) detection systems. More specifically, this paper makes
the following contributions.
Firstly, we demonstrate the effectiveness and advantages of
exploiting a social botnet for spam distribution on Twitter. This
attack is motivated by that Twitter currently only suspends the
accounts that originate spam tweets without punishing those
retweeting spam tweets [16]. If the social botnet is organized
as a retweet tree in which only the root originates spam tweets
and all the others merely retweet spams, all the social bots
except the root bot can escape suspension. Given a set of
social bots, we formulate the formation of the retweeting tree
as a multi-objective optimization problem to minimize the
time taken for a spam tweet to reach a maximum number of
victim Twitter users at the lowest cost of the botmaster. Since
the optimization is NP-hard, we give a heuristic solution and
confirm its efficacy with real experiments on Twitter and trace-
driven simulations.
Secondly, we show that a social botnet can easily manipu-
late the digital influence [17], [18] of Twitter users, which has
been increasingly used in ad targeting [19], [20], customer-
service improvement [21], recruitment [22], and many other
applications. This attack stems from the fact that almost all ex-
isting digital-influence tools such as Klout, Kred, and Retweet
Rank, measure a user’s digital influence exclusively based on
his2 interactions with others users on Twitter. If social bots col-
laborate to manipulate the interactions of target Twitter users,
they could effectively manipulate the victims’ digital influence.
The efficacy of this attack is confirmed by real experiments on
Twitter.
Finally, we propose two countermeasures to defend against
the two reported attacks, respectively. To defend against the
2. No gender implication.
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2botnet-based spam distribution, we maintain a spam score for
each user and update the score whenever the corresponding
user retweets a spam. The user is suspended if his spam
score exceeds a predefined threshold. To defense against the
botnet-based influence manipulation attacks, we propose to
find sufficient credible users and only use the interactions
originated from these credible users for digital-influence mea-
surement. Moreover, based on the measurement in Section §4,
we design a new model to compute the influence score which
is resilient to the manipulation from a single credible social
bot. We confirm the effectiveness of both defenses via detailed
simulation studies driven by real-world datasets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. §2 introduces
the construction of a social botnet on Twitter. §3 and §4 show
the efficacy and merits of using the social botnet for spam
distribution and digital-influence manipulation, respectively.
§5 details and evaluates two countermeasures. §6 discusses the
related work. §7 concludes this paper.
2 BUILDING A SOCIAL BOTNET ON TWITTER
In this paper, we focus on networked social bots in Twitter, so
we first outline the Twitter basics to help illustrate our work.
The readers familiar with Twitter can safely skip this paragraph
without any loss of continuity. Unlike Facebook, the social
relationships on Twitter are unidirectional by users following
others. If user A follows user B, A is B’s follower, and B is A’s
friend. In most cases, a user does not need prior consent from
another user whom he wants to follow. Twitter also allows
users to control who can follow them, but this feature is rarely
used. In addition, users can choose to unfollow others and block
their selected followers. A Twitter user can send text-based
posts of up to 140 characters, known as tweets, which can be
read by all its followers. Tweets can be public (the default
setting) and are visible to anyone with or without a Twitter
account, and they can also be protected and are only visible
to previously approved Twitter followers. A retweet is a re-
posting of someone else’s tweet. A user can retweet the tweets
of anyone he follows or does not follow, and his retweets can be
seen by all his followers. Moreover, a user can reply to a post
(tweet or retweet) and ensure that specific users can see his
posts by mentioning them via inserting “@username” for every
specific user into his posts. Finally, each user has a timeline
which shows all the latest tweets, retweets, and replies of his
followers.
We construct a social botnet on Twitter consisting of a
botmaster and a number of social bots which are legitimate
Twitter accounts. Twitter accounts can be manually created
or purchased at affordable prices. For example, we bought
1,000 Twitter accounts with $57 from some Internet sellers for
experimental purposes only. The botmaster is in the form of
a Java application, which we developed from scratch based
on the OAuth protocol [23] and open Twitter APIs. It could
perform all the Twitter operations on behalf of all social bots to
make the bots look like legitimate users.
3 SOCIAL BOTNET FOR SPAM DISTRIBUTION
3.1 Why the Social Botnet for Spam Distribution?
As the popularity of Twitter rapidly grows, spammers have
started to distribute spam tweets which can be broadly defined
as unwanted tweets that contains malicious URLs in most
cases or occasionally malicious texts [8], [9], [24]. According
to a study in 2010 [8], roughly 8% of the URLs in tweets are
malicious ones that direct users to scams/malware/phishing
sites, and about 0.13% of the spam URLs will be clicked.
Given the massive scale of Twitter, understanding how spam
tweets are distributed is important for designing effective spam
defenses.
The simplest method for spam distribution is to let social
bots distribute spam tweets independently from each other,
which we refer to as the independent method. In particular,
the botmaster can instruct every bot to directly post spam
tweets which can be seen by all its followers. According to
the Twitter rules,3 the accounts considered as spam originators
will be permanently suspended. Since there are sophisticated
techniques such as [25], [26] detecting malicious URLs, this
independent approach may subject almost all social bots to
permanent suspension in a short time window.
A more advanced method, which we propose and refer
to as the botnet method, is to exploit the fact that Twitter
currently only suspends the originators of spam tweets without
punishing their retweeters. In the simplest case, the botmaster
forms a single retweeting tree, where every bot is associated
with a unique vertex and is followed by its children bots. Then
only the root bot originates spam tweets, and all the others
simply retweet the spam tweets from their respective parent.
Given the same set of social bots, both methods can distribute
spam tweets to the same set of non-bot Twitter users, but
only the root bot will be suspended under the botnet method.
Obviously, the botnet method is economically beneficial for
the botmaster because it involves non-trivial human effort or
money to create a large social botnet.
We use an experiment on Twitter to validate our conjec-
ture for the independent method. Our experiment uses three
different social botnets with each containing 100 bots. The
experiment proceeds in hours. At the beginning of every hour,
every bot in the same botnet almost simultaneously posts a
spam tweet comprising two parts. The first part is different
from every bot and randomly selected from the list of tweets
returned after querying “music,” while the second part is an
identical malicious URL randomly selected from the Shalla’s
blacklists (http://www.shallalist.de/) and shortened using the
bitly service (http://bitly.com) for use on Twitter. We find that
all the bots in the three botnets are suspected in two, five, and
six hours. Based on this experiment, we can safely conjecture
that the independent method will cause most bots in a larger
botnet to be suspended in a short period, thus putting the
botmaster at serious economic disadvantage.
We use a separate set of experiments to shed light on the
advantage of the botnet method. In this experiment, we first
use 111 bots to build a full 10-ary tree of depth two, i.e., each
node except the leaves has exactly 10 children. The experiment
proceeds in hourly rounds repeatedly on these 111 bots. At
the beginning of every hour of the first round, the root bot
posts a spam tweet, while all its descendants merely retweet
the spam tweet after a small random delay. Then we replace the
suspended bot by a random bot alive from the same network,
re-organize the bot tree, and start the next round. We totally run
the experiments for five rounds, in each of which only the root
bot is suspended after six hours on average, and all other bots
who just retweet the spams (with five times) remain alive. To
3. http://support.twitter.com/articles/18311\#
3check whether the bots will be suspended by retweeting more
spams, we reduce the spamming frequency from one per hour
to one per day, and repeat the experiment for ten more rounds,
and all the retweeting bots were still alive at the end of the
experiment. In addition, we use the similar methodology to test
three other different botnets of 2, 40, and 100 bots, respectively,
and obtain the similar results.
It has been very challenging in the research community to
conduct experimental studies about the attacks on online social
networks and also the corresponding countermeasures. In the
experiments above, we have to control the social bots to post
malicious URLs to evaluate Twitter’s suspension policy, which
may harm benign users. To minimize the negative impact on
the legitimate users, we adopted a methodology similar to
[4], [9], [27], [28]. Specifically, none of the purchased accounts
followed any legitimate user and thus were very unlikely to be
followed by legitimate users, which greatly reduced the pos-
sibility of the posted spams being viewed by legitimate users.
In addition, we deleted every spam tweet immediately after
the experiment to further avoid it being clicked by legitimate
users. Our experiments clearly show that Twitter has a much
more strict policy against posting original spam tweets than
retweeting spam tweets.
3.2 Optimal Social Botnet for Spam Distribution
§3.1 motivates the benefits of using the social botnet for spam
distribution on Twitter. Given a set of social bots, what is the
optimal way for spam distribution? We give an affirmative
answer to this important question in this section.
3.2.1 Problem Setting and Performance Metrics
We consider a botnet V of n bots, where each bot i ∈ [1, n]
can be followed by other bots and also other Twitter users
outside the botnet (called non-bot followers hereafter). Let Fi
denote the non-bot followers of bot i. Note that Fi ∩ Fj may
be non-empty (∀i 6= j), meaning that any two bots may have
overlapping non-bot followers. We further let F = ⋃ni=1 Fi.
How to attract non-bot followers for the bots is related to social
engineering [29] and orthogonal to the focus of this paper. Note
that it is very easy in practice for a bot to attract many non-bot
followers, as shown in [4], [5], [14], [15].
The botmaster distributes spam tweets along one or multi-
ple retweeting trees, and the vertices of every retweeting tree
corresponds to a disjoint subset of the n bots. In addition,
every bot in a retweeting tree is followed by its children. As
discussed, the root of every retweeting tree will originate spam
tweets, which will appear in the Twitter timeline of its children
bots and then be retweeted. The distribution of a particular
spam tweet finishes until all the bots on all the retweeting trees
either tweet or retweet it once and only once.
Given a set V with n bots and F , we propose three metrics
to evaluate the efficacy of botnet-based spam distribution.
• Coverage: Let C denote the non-bot receivers of a given
spam tweet and be called the coverage set. The coverage
of spam distribution is then defined as |C||F| ∈ [0, 1].
• Delay: We define the delay of spam distribution, de-
noted by τ , as the average time for each user in C to
see a given spam tweet since it is generated by the root
bot. A user may follow multiple bots and thus see the
same spam tweet multiple times, in which case only the
first time is counted.
• Cost: We use |S| and |S˜| to define the cost of spam
distribution, where S denotes the indices of suspended
bots after distributing a given spam, and S˜ denotes
the set of non-bot followers will be lost due to the
suspension of S , i.e., S˜ = C \ (⋃i∈V\S Fi).
The above metrics motivates three design objectives. First,
we obviously want to maximize the coverage to be one, which
happens when all the n bots participate in spam distribution
by belonging to one retweeting tree. Second, many malicious
URLs in spam tweets are hosted on compromised servers and
will be invalidated once detected, and Twitter will remove
spam tweets as soon as they are identified. It is thus also im-
portant to minimize the delay. Finally, since it incurs non-trivial
human effort or money to create bots and attract followers for
them, it is critical to minimize the cost as well.
3.2.2 Design Constraints
A major design challenge is how to circumvent Twitter’s sus-
pension rules4 that are evolving in accordance with changing
user (mis)behavior. We classify the suspension rules into strict
and loose ones. Violators of strict rules will be immediately
suspended. The strict rule most relevant to our work is that the
users originate spam tweets containing malicious URLs will be
suspended. In contrast, a violator of loose rules will initially
become suspicious and later be suspended if his violations of
related loose rules exceed some unknown threshold Twitter
defines and uses internally. Examples of loose rules include
repeatedly posting others’ tweets as your own or the same
tweet, massively following/unfollowing people in a short time
period, etc. In addition, the research community have discov-
ered many useful loose rules for spam-tweet detection such
as those in [25], [30]–[35] which are likely to be or have been
adopted by Twitter into their evolving suspension-rule list. As
discussed, we use the botnet method for spam distribution in
order to largely circumvent this strict rule. In the following, we
introduce five design constraints related to some loose rules
we consider most relevant. By following these constraints, the
social bots can cause much less suspicion to Twitter and thus
are much less likely to be suspended.
1. The maximum height of a retweeting tree is K = 10
according to [30]. Hence we claim that any spam tweet will not
be retweeted more than 10 times.
2. A bot only retweets the spam tweets posted by its parent
bot on the retweeting tree it follows, as retweeting the tweets
from non-followed users is known to be effective in detecting
spam tweets [33].
3. Any spam tweet from an arbitrary bot will be retweeted
by at most 100r percent of its followers. As r approaches
one, the bot will become increasingly suspicious according to
community-based spam detection algorithms [24], [36]. Recall
that the followers of any bot i ∈ [1, n] comprise other bots
and also non-bot users (i.e., Fi). Note that non-bot followers
rarely retweet spam tweets in practice, but we require all bot
followers to retweet spam tweets. Then bot i can have no more
than d r|Fi|1−r e bot followers.
4. The retweeting lag at any hop j ∈ [1,K] is a random
variable ti which follows a hop-wise statistical distribution
according to [30], as it is quite abnormal for a user to immedi-
ately retweet a post once seeing it. Here the retweeting lag is
4. http://support.twitter.com/articles/18311#
4M = 3
(a)
(b)
(c)
c = 5
Fig. 1. Exemplary retweeting trees with 12 bots, where M = 3 and the
botmaster’s suspension budget is c = 5.
defined as the time elapsed when a bot sees a spam tweet until
it retweets it.
5. The social bots within the first M hops will be suspended
once Twitter finds that they are involved in (re)tweeting a
spam tweet. This constraint is motivated by recent findings [14]
that spammer accounts on Twitter tend to be connected and
clustered by mutual followings. It is thus reasonable to assume
that Twitter either have been utilized or will soon utilize
these research findings to suspend the accounts involved in
distributing a spam tweet within the first M > 0 hops. After
introducing this constraint, we relax the third one by allowing
arbitrary topology in the first M hops because all of its bots
will be suspended.
3.2.3 Problem Formulation
Give the above design objectives and constraints, we now
attempt to formulate botnet-based spam distribution as an
optimization problem. The major challenge lies in the infea-
sibility of simultaneously achieving the maximum coverage,
the minimum delay, and the minimum cost. Fig. 1 shows
an example with 12 bots and M = 3, and we assume that
every bot has the same number of non-bot followers. In one
extreme shown in Fig. 1(a), we can minimize the delay τ by
letting every bot be a root bot, but the cost is obviously the
maximum possible because all the bots will be suspended. In
the other extreme shown in Fig. 1(b), we can form a single
retweeting tree with exactly three bots within the first three
hops, in which case we can achieve the minimum possible cost,
but the achievable delay will always be larger than that in the
first case no matter how the retweeting tree beyond three hops
is formed. In addition, we assume for the second case that the
retweeting tree can include all the 12 bots, leading to the same
coverage of one as in the first case. If there are too many bots,
however, some of them may not be able to be incorporated into
the retweeting tree due to the first and third design constraints,
and the resulting coverage will be smaller than that of the first
case.
To deal with the above challenge, assume that the botmaster
has a suspension budget c ∈ [M,n] bots, referring to the
maximum number of suspended bots it can tolerate. Note that
the more bots in the first M hops, the more non-bot followers
in F closer to the root bot which can receive a given spam
tweet in shorter time, and thus the smaller the delay. Under the
budget constraint, the minimum delay can hence be achieved
only when there are exactly c bots within the first M hops, as
shown in Fig. 1(c) with c = 5.
What is the optimal way to form a retweeting tree as in
Fig. 1(c) given the cost, coverage, and delay requirements?
Recall that the cost is defined by |S| and |S˜|. Since |S| = c
under the budget constraint, we just need to minimize |S˜|. To
mathematically express the cost and coverage requirements,
we let {Vk}Kk=1 denote K disjoint subsets of the bot indices
{1, . . . , n}, where K = 10 is the maximum height of the
retweeting tree (see Constraint 1), Vk denote the bot indices
at level k of the retweeting tree, and
⋃K
k=1 Vi ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
If the optimal retweeting tree eventually found is of depth
K∗ < K, the sets {Vk}Kk=K∗+1 will all be empty. Recall that Fi
denotes the set of non-bot followers of bot i ∈ [1, n] and that
F = ⋃ni=1 Fi. Then we have S˜ = C \ (⋃i∈Vk,k∈[M+1,K∗] Fi)
and the coverage set C = ⋃i∈Vk,k∈[1,K] Fi ⊆ F and need
to maximize |C|. Since S˜ ⊆ C, we can combine the cost
and coverage requirements into a single metric |S˜||C| and then
attempt to minimize it.
It is a little more complicated to derive the delay. As
discussed, a non-bot user may follow multiple bots at differ-
ent levels, in which case it is considered a follower on the
lowest level among those. Let Φk denote the set of non-bot
followers at k ∈ [1,K]. It follows that Φ1 = Fi (i ∈ V1)
and Φk =
⋃
i∈Vk Fi −
⋃k−1
l=1 Φl for k ∈ [1,K]. According to
Constraint 4, it takes
∑k
j=1 tj for a spam tweet to reach level-k
non-bot followers, where tj denotes the retweeting lag of hop
j ∈ [1,K], and t1 = 0. Since there are totally |Φk| non-bot
followers at level k and |C| non-bot followers across all levels,
we can compute the delay as
τ =
1
|C|
K∑
k=1
k∑
j=1
tj |Φk| .
Finally, we reduce the three-objective optimization problem
to the following single-objective minimization problem.
min f({Vk}Kk=1) = αβ
|S˜|
|C| + (1− α)τ
s.t.
K⋃
k=1
Vi ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
Vi ∩ Vj = φ, ∀i 6= j ∈ [1,K]
|
M⋃
k=1
Vi| ≤ c
∑
i∈Vk
d r|Fi|
1− r e ≥ |Vk+1|,∀k ∈ [M − 1,K − 1]
(1)
We have two remarks here. First, α ∈ [0, 1] is a adjustable
weight that reflects the relative importance of coverage and
delay, and β is a fixed scaling factor to unify two different
objective units. Second, the last constraint is due to the afore-
mentioned third design constraint.
The above optimization problem can be viewed as a varia-
tion of classical set partition problem (SPP), which is NP-hard.
In what follows, we introduce a heuristic approximation solu-
tion by constructing a collection of disjointed subsets {Vk}Kk=0
from the botnet set.
3.2.4 Heuristic Solution
Our intuition is to use all the budget c and fill the first M hops
of the retweeting trees with the bots having the lowest sus-
pension cost in terms of the number of lost non-bot followers.
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Fig. 2. Performance comparison of independent and botnet methods in spam distribution at different αs in terms of the single objective f .
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Fig. 3. Performance comparison of independent and botnet methods in
spam distribution in terms of separate objective.
We then recursively place the bots with the highest number of
non-bot followers from level M + 1 to the last level, in order to
reduce the average latency as well as cost.
To begin with, our approximation is built on the solutions
to the traditional maximum coverage problem (or MAXCOVER)
and the minimum coverage problem (MINCOVER), which is to
select k sets from a collection of subsets of a ground set so that
the their union is maximized [37] or minimized, respectively.
MAXCOVER and MINCOVER problems are both NP-hard and
have greedy approximation algorithms by iteratively selecting
the maximum or minimum subset after extracting the selected
elements, respectively.
Our solution consists of the following two steps. First, given
the budget c for S and that all the followers in S˜ will be lost
because of the suspension, we minimize the objective |S˜| by
using MINCOVER to choose c bots as S˜ with the minimum total
number of non-bot followers. In doing so, we can determine
the union of the bot set for the first M level. The bot subset in
each level will be determined later. Here we just assume that
S˜ has been divided into the M groups, each corresponding
to the bots in one of the first M levels. Second, we construct
{Vk}Kk=M+1 to greedily increase the coverage C and at the
same time lower the average delay T . Specifically, assuming
that we have known VM , to determine VM+1, we first set the
cardinality of VM+1 be equal to
∑
i∈Vkd r|Fi|1−r e according to
the last constraint in (1) and then use MAXCOVER to choose
a subset of |VM+1| bots from the remaining bot set with the
maximum number of non-bot followers. We repeat this greedy
selection for every level k = M + 2, . . . ,K .
The remaining problem is how to partition S˜ into M
subsets, each corresponding to one of the first M levels. A
heuristic observation here is that we need to maximize |VM |, as
the more non-bot followers of the social bots in the M th level,
the more social bots in level M + 1 and subsequent levels, and
also the lower average delay according to the last constraint in
(1). Given the budget |S˜| = c, we obtain |VM |max = c−M + 1
when the retweeting forest has a single tree whose first M − 1
levels form a straight line, as shown in Fig. 1(b). The bots in the
M th level is then determined by using MAXCOVER to choose
the c−M + 1 bots from S˜ with the maximum number of non-
bot followers.
To determine the level for each of the remaining M−1 bots,
we sort the remaining M − 1 bots in S˜ in the descending order
according to the number of their non-bot followers and assign
them to the corresponding level, e.g., the bot with the highest
number of non-bot followers will be assigned to the first level.
Note that it is possible that after we maximizing the number
of bots at the M th level, the remaining bots are less than the
allowed on the M th level, so the (M + 1)-th is not full. To
further reduce the average delay in such cases, we move the
exceeding bots in the M th level to the first level.
After determining {Vi}Ki=1 from the social-bot set
{1, . . . , n}, we can then build the final retweeting forest (tree).
Specifically, the number of retweeting trees is equal to the
cardinality of V1, which is one if the (M + 1)-th level is full
or greater than one otherwise. We then randomly choose one
social bot from V1 to be the root of the retweeting tree with
more than one level, which is followed by the bots from the
second to M th level determined by V2 to VM , respectively.
Finally, we build the level from k = M + 1 to K by select-
ing certain number of social bots from Vk according the last
constraint in Eq. (1).
3.3 Trace-driven Evaluation
We conduct trace-driven simulations to compare the perfor-
mance of spam distribution using the independent and botnet
methods, as well as evaluating the tradeoffs among the multi-
ple goals in the botnet method.
The evaluation for independent bots is straightforward. In
particular, given the bot set V with |V| = n, we place all the
bots in the first level which will be suspended completely. We
then have C = S˜ = n, and τ = 0. The single objective in
Problem (1) is thus f = α.
To evaluate the botnet method, we set up the simulations
according to existing measurement data and heuristics. We set
6K = 10, and t1 = 0, ti = 0.5i hour for i = 2, . . .K according
to [30]. To build {Fi}ni=1, we generate |Fi| according to the
Gaussian distribution with µ = 32 as the average number of
followers in the dataset of [30]. We also set the variance to
σ2 = 5, generate a legitimate follower set F with |F| = 6000,5
and randomly choose |Fi| followers from the set F for each bot
i. In addition, according to [14], the average path length of the
spammer community is 2.60, so we set M = 3 to suspend the
bots in the first three hops of F . Finally, we set β to one and
the retweeting ratio r = 0.2. Due to space constraints, we focus
on on the impact of α, c, and n and do not report the impact of
|F|, σ2, r, M, or β in this paper.
Fig. 2 compares the independent and botnet methods using
the objective function f with different weights α. As stated
before, f is simply equal to α for the independent case because
τ = 0 and S˜ = C. For the botnet method, the objective f is
the weighted sum of |S˜||C| and the delay τ . When α is small, τ
has higher impact on f than |S˜||C| , while when α is large,
|S˜|
|C|
will dominate f . Specifically, we can see from Fig. 2(a) that
when α = 0.4, the independent method outperforms the botnet
method with smaller f . However, as shown in Fig. 2(b), when
α increases to 0.65, the botnet method can achieve lower f than
the independent method does. This trend is more obvious for
the same reason in Fig. 2(c) where α = 0.9.
Figs. 3 compare the two methods in terms of separate
objectives including the number of lost legitimate followers
and the average delay under different budget |S| = c. We can
see that both methods have the same coverage |C|, which is
equal to |F|, as well as the maximum value of C . In addition,
we can see from Fig. 3(b) that the delay of the independent
method is zero, while that of botnet method could be on the
order of hours. Finally, Fig. 3(a) shows that the botnet method
has significant advantage than the independent method in
terms of |S˜|, the number of lost legitimate followers, as |S˜|
is always equal to |F| for the independent scheme.
Finally, the botnet size n also has some impact on separate
objectives in the botnet case. Fig. 3(a) shows that |S˜||C| decreases
as n increases. The reason is that the larger n, the more bots
with less non-bot followers will be assigned to the first M
levels, resulting in smaller |S˜| and thus larger |S˜||C| . In addition,
Fig. 3(b) shows that the larger n, the higher the average delay
τ , which is also expected.
In summary, from the view point of the botmaster, these
evaluations show that the botnet scheme is more flexible than
the independent method when considering multiple objectives
of the spam distribution at the same time.
4 SOCIAL BOTNET FOR DIGITAL-INFLUENCE MANIP-
ULATION
In this section, we first briefly introduce digital influence and
then experimentally show the efficacy of using the social botnet
to manipulate digital influence.
4.1 Rise of Digital Influence
Digital influence is one of the hottest trends in social media
and is defined as “the ability to cause effect, change behavior,
and drive measurable outcomes online” in [38]. The huge
5. For the Gaussian distribution with µ = 32 and σ2 = 5, the probability
for generating a negative |Fi| is negligible.
commercial potential of digital influence is in line with the
increasingly recognized importance of word-of-mouth mar-
keting on social networks. There are also growing business
cases in which various companies successfully promoted their
services/products by reaching out to most influential social-
network users in their respective context [38].
The future of digital influence also relies on effective tools
to measure it. As reported in [38], there are over 20 popular
digital-influence software vendors such as Klout [39] , Kred
[40], Retweet Rank [41], PeerIndex [42], TwitterGrade [43]
and Twitalyzer [44]. Every vendor has its proprietary method
to compute an influence score for a given user based on his
activities within his affiliated social network such as Twitter,
Facebook, Google+, and LinkedIn, and higher scores represent
greater influence. As shown in Table 1, Klout, Kred, and
PeerIndex use normalized scores with different average values
and scales, while RetweetRank, TweetGrader, and Twitalyzer
represent digital-influence scores using percentile.
The typical business model of digital-influence vendors
is based around connecting businesses with individuals of
high influence. Companies have paid to contact individuals
with high influence scores in hopes that free merchandise and
other perks will influence them to spread positive publicity
for them. For example, in 2011 Chevy offered 139 3-day test
drives of its 2012 Sonic model to selected participants with
the Klout score of at least 35 [19]. As another example, it
has been reported that some recruiters have used the digital-
influence scores to select qualified candidates [22]. In addition,
customer service providers like Genesys prioritize customer
complaints according to their digital-influence scores to avoid
the amplification of complaints by influential users in OSNs
[21]. Klout announced a growth of 2,000 new partners over a
one year period in May 2012.
4.2 Botnet-based Digital-influence Manipulation
Given the great potential of digital influence, whether it can
be maliciously manipulated is an important research issue.
For example, assume that malicious users could collude to
significantly increase their influence scores. A company using
the digital-influence service may consider them most influen-
tial and choose them as the targets of important marketing
campaigns by mistake, thus having potentially huge financial
loss, while malicious users can potentially benefit, e.g., by
getting free sample products. In addition, malicious users may
attract more legitimate followers who tend to follow most
influential users and thus become more influential.
As the first work of its kind, we now explore the feasibility
of using the botnet to manipulate digital influence. Our stud-
ies involve three most popular digital-influence vendors for
Twitter users: Klout, Kred, and Retweet Rank. For clarity, we
summarize their key features as follows.
• Klout: The Klout score of a Twitter user is on the scale of
1 to 100 and updated daily based on how frequently he
or she is retweeted and mentioned in the last 90 days.
The average Klout score is close to 20, and the score of
the 90th percentile is over 50.6
• Kred: The Kred score of a Twitter user is on the scale
of 1 to 1,000 and updated in real time according to how
6. http://therealtimereport.com/2012/04/11/
how-good-is-your-klout-score/
7Digital-influence score
Vendor Start #users (M) Update Scale Average 90-percentile Target OSNs
Klout 2008 620+ daily 0-100 20 50 Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, Google+, Insta-
gram, Foursquare
Kred 2011 - hourly 0-1000 500 656 Twitter, LinkedIn, Facebook, Quora
PeerIndex 2009 50+ daily 0-100 19 42 Twitter, Facebook
Retweet Rank 2008 3.5 hourly 0-100 50 90 Twitter
Tweet Grader 2010 10+ daily 0-100 50 90 Twitter
Twitalyzer 2009 1 daily 0-100 50 90 Twitter
TABLE 1
Six popular digital-influence software vendors. The data was collected at October, 2014.
frequently he or she is retweeted, replied, mentioned,
and followed on Twitter in the last 1,000 days.7
• Retweet Rank: It ranks the users based on how many
times they each have been retweeted recently and how
many followers/friends they each have.8 Retweet ranks
are updated on an hourly basis, and a retweet rank
of x means that the corresponding user is the xth
most influential on Twitter. A retweet rank can also be
translated into a percentile score ranging from 1 to 100,
indicating how the user score relative to other Twitter
users.
Given a social botnet of n bots, we want to investigate
whether it is feasible to generate an arbitrary influence score
di for every bot i ∈ [1, n] under each of the above three tools.
Since every bot is usually indistinguishable from a legitimate
user, our investigation can also shed light on the feasibility
of using the botnet to manipulate the influence score of an
arbitrary Twitter user. Since every digital-influence vendor
(including the above three) usually keeps confidential its de-
tailed algorithm for computing influence scores, our studies are
purely based on real Twitter experiments. According to [38], we
conjecture that the following three factors play the important
role in determining a user’s digital-influence score.
• Actions. Both the number and the type of actions have
large impacts on a user’s digital-influence score. Intu-
itively, the more actions the user can attract, the higher
his digital-influence score. Moreover, different types
of actions may have different impacts. For example,
retweeting or replying should be more indicative than
following because the latter has been shown to be more
vulnerable to fake [14].
• Audiences. Given a target user u, we define all the users
who have retweeted or replied u’s tweets, or mentioned
or followed u as u’s audiences. We conjecture that the
larger the audience size, the higher the digital-influence
scores. The intuition is that the target user is more
influential if each of his 100 tweets is retweeted by a
different user than all 100 tweets are retweeted by the
same one user. We also conjecture that the higher the
digital-influence scores his audience have, the higher
the target user’s digital-influence score.
• Popularity of tweets. The digital-influence score of a tar-
get user is determined by the popularity of his tweets.
We want to explore how the distribution of the tweet
popularity determines the overall influence of the target
user.
7. http://kred.com/rules
8. http://www.retweetrank.com/view/about
Based on these three factors, we then present how to or-
chestrate the social botnets to manipulate the digital-influence
scores.
4.2.1 Impact of Different Actions
Since almost all digital-influence tools measure a Twitter users
digital influence as his ability to drive others to actions, our first
experiment aims to evaluate the social botnet’s impact with
following, retweeting, and mentioning. We do not consider
replying, as replying is treated by Twitter as a special type
of mentioning and is thus expected to have the same effect as
mentioning.
The first set of experiments involves n = 1, 000 social bots,
each of which has no interaction with any other Twitter account
and hence is not scored by Klout, Kred, or Retweet Rank. Note
that Klout assigns an influence score of 10 to new users, while
Kred and Retweet Rank both assign a zero score to new users.
We randomly choose three disjoint groups, each containing 10
social bots and performing a unique action. For every social bot
in the following group, we add 10 randomly chosen social bots
as followers each day of the first 10 days and then 100 followers
each day of the next 10 days. Likewise, every social bot in the
retweeting (or mentioning) group is retweeted (or mentioned) by
randomly chosen social bots 10, 100 and 1000 times each day
in the first, second, and the last 10 days, respectively. Since
different vendors have different schedules for score updating,
we report the social bots’ influence scores observed at every
midnight. In addition, since the three vendors have different
score scales, we normalize different influence scores with re-
spect to the corresponding maximum scores to facilitate direct
comparison. In particular, we show x/100 and y/1000 for a
Klout score x and a Kred score y, respectively, and report the
percentile score for Tweet Rank.
Figs. 6(a)∼6(b) show the impact of following and retweet-
ing9 actions on Klout, Kred, and Retweet Rank influence scores,
where every data point is the average across the same group.
We can see from Fig. 6(a) that the Klout influence score is
not affected by the number of followers, while both Kred
and Retweet Rank influence scores increase as the number of
followers increases. This indicates that a social botnet can easily
boost the Kred and Retweet Rank influence scores of its mem-
bers by purposely following each other. Moreover, we can see
from Fig. 6(b) that all three types of influence scores increase
as the number that a user is retweeted increases. On the one
hand, this makes much sense, as the higher the frequency in
which a user is retweeted, the higher influence of that user
has in its local neighborhood. On the other hand, this also
renders the influence score measurement system vulnerable to
9. Mentioning action has similar result with retweeting [1]. We omitted
here due to space constraints.
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Fig. 6. Manipulating digital influence by following and retweeting.
social botnets, as colluding social bots can fake arbitrarily high
retweeting frequency for any target user.
We can also see from Figs. 6(a) and 6(b) that none of our
experiments has been able to escalate a user’s influence score to
an extremely high value, and we conjecture that there are two
reasons for such difficulty. First, the audience size is limited, as
we only have 1,000 social bots for experiment. We will show
in the next set of experiments that the audience size has a
large impact on the digital-influence scores. Second, it is likely
that all the vendors have set up rules such that it is extremely
difficult to achieve almost full digital-influence scores [39]–[41].
Nevertheless, at the end of the experiments, Table 1 shows
that all the digital-influence scores being manipulated have
exceeded the 90-th percentile.
4.2.2 Impact of Different Audience Sizes
In this set of experiments, we measure the impact of different
audience sizes on digital-influence scores. Recall that we define
a user u’s audiences as the set of users who have retweeted,
mentioned, or followed u. We then try to answer the following
questions. First, for two users with different audience sizes but
the same numbers of actions, will the one with more audiences
have a higher digital-influence score than the other? Second, it
there an upper limit for a single social bot to manipulate the
influence score of a target user? There could be two alternative
answers to each of the two questions. On the one hand, if
the digital-influence scores are related to both the number of
incoming actions and the audience size, a single user should
have limited power to manipulate the target user’s influence
score, and we thus need a large social botnet to manipulate the
target user’s influence score to some extremely high value. On
the other hand, if the digital-influence scores may not relate to
the audience size, then 100 incoming actions from 100 different
social bots would yield the same result as 100 incoming actions
from a single social bot.
To verify which of the two conjectures is correct, we build
three social botnets with 1, 10, and 100 bots, respectively. For
each social botnet, we set 10 target users and retweet 100 tweets
of each target each day for seven days. In other words, each
bot in the three social botnets retweets 100, 10, and 1 times
per day, respectively. Fig 4 shows the digital-influence scores
of the 30 targets. As we can see, the audience size has no
impact on both Kred and Retweet Rank scores but has large
impact on the Klout scores. Specifically, the larger the audience
size, the higher the Klout scores, and vice versa. Moreover,
the Klout scores experience a sharp increase in the first day
and then increase much slower in the following days. As a
result, a single social bot can manipulate a target user’s Kred
and Retweet Rank scores with a large number of actions, while
both large audience sizes and significant actions are necessary
to obtain high Klout scores. We also conclude that Klout is
more resilient to the social botnet than Kred and Retweet Rank
are.
4.2.3 Impact of Tweet Popularity
From the first set of experiments, we can see that the retweeting
is the most effective way to manipulate a target user’s digital-
influence score. Given the same audience, the attacker can
either retweet a single tweet of the target user to make this
tweet very popular or retweet many of target user tweets
so that each tweet will be less popular. We would like to
answer which strategy will yield higher digital-influence score,
i.e., whether tweet popularity has any impact on the digital-
influence scores? To answer this question, we build a social
botnet with 100 bots. We then select two groups with each
containing 10 target users for manipulation. For the first group,
each target first publishes a tweet, which is then retweeted
by all the 100 social bots; while for the second group, each
target user publishes 100 tweets, each of which is retweeted by
one social bot. We repeat this process daily and measure the
digital-influence scores of the 20 targets. As we can see from
Fig 5, the tweet popularity has no impact on both Klout and
Kred scores and limited impact on the Retweet Rank score. In
particular, adopting the second strategy will lead to a slightly
higher Retweet Rank score of the target user.
4.2.4 Speed of Digital-influence Manipulation
Our last experiment targets evaluating how fast influence
scores can be manipulated. Same with the last set of experi-
ments, we choose the retweeting as the action due to its effec-
tiveness. For this purpose, we randomly select another three
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Fig. 8. The true and false positive rates with different γs.
different groups of social bots, each containing 10 target bots.
Every bot in the first, second, and third groups is retweeted 10,
100, and 1,000 times every day by random bots until the scores
reach the 90th percentile, which corresponds to 50, 656, and 90
in Klout, Kred, and Retweet Rank, respectively.
Fig. 7 further shows the impact of retweeting frequency
on the change of influence scores, where every data point
represents the average across the same bot group. In particular,
we can see that the number of days needed to increase the
group average influence score from the initial value to 80-th
or 90-th percentile is approximately inversely proportional to
the retweeting frequency. In addition, we can see that for all
three vendors, it is possible by retweeting 1000 times per day
to reach the 80-th percentile and the 90-th percentile with only
one and two days, respectively.
4.2.5 Remarks
We have two remarks to make.
First, at the end of the experiments, no account was sus-
pended by Twitter, as none of the accounts had conducted
illegitimate activities such as spamming and aggressively fol-
lowing and unfollowing which could trigger suspension by
Twitter.
In addition, both the spam distribution and the digital
influence manipulation attacks show that social botnet has
significant advantage over isolated bots. In particular, even
though the attacker can disseminate spams to the same le-
gitimate recipients using isolated bots, those isolated bots
will be quickly suspended under Twitter’s current policy or
its variation and thus incurs significant cost for the attacker.
Moreover, it is extremely difficult for the attacker to boost a
single bot’s digital influence score solely by letting the target
bot tweet or retweet other legitimate users’ tweets, as long
as the digital influence score is not entirely determined by
user’s outgoing interactions, as it is difficult for bots to attract
incoming interactions from legitimate users.
5 DEFENSES
In this section, we propose two countermeasures for the two
attacks above, respectively.
5.1 Defense against Botnet-based Spam Distribution
Recall that in social botnet-based spam distribution, the at-
tacker exploits retweeting trees to distribute spams (i.e., tweets
with malicious URLs) such that only the bots on the first M
(e.g., M = 1 in Twitter currently) levels of retweeting trees will
be suspended.
To defend against this attack, we propose to track each
user’s history of participating in spam distribution and sus-
pend a user if his accumulated suspicious behaviors exceed
some threshold. Specifically, for each user v we maintain a spam
score sv , which is updated every time user v retweets a spam.
Once sv exceeds a predefined threshold, user v is labeled as a
spammer and suspended.
We now discuss how sv is updated. Our intuition is that
the closer the user to the spam source, the more likely he
is a member of the social botnet. The reason is that social
botnet usually prefers shorter retweeting path for fast spam
dissemination, while a spam tweet traversing a long retweeting
path, i.e., sequentially retweeted by many accounts, incurs
large delay and gives more time for Twitter to detect them. To
reflect this idea, whenever a user retweets a spam, we update
his spam score as
sv = sv + γ
d , (2)
where d is the number of retweeting hops between the spam
source to v, and γ ≤ 1 is the attenuation factor of distance.
Note that d = 0 if user v is the source of a spam. In this way,
any user who has retweeted spams is punished by having his
spam score increased. Once a user’s spam score exceeds certain
predetermined threshold, the user is suspended. Note that
Twitter currently suspends a user whenever he has published
one spam tweet. To mimic the current Twitter policy, we can
set the threshold as one.
5.1.1 Evaluation
Similar to Section 3.3, we built a Twitter subnet composed of
6000 legitimate users and 400 social bots. Each social bot has
|Fi| legitimate followers, where |Fi| is drawn from Gaussian
distribution with µ = 32 and δ2 = 5, and each social bot
follows all other social bots. We assume that the attacker builds
the optimal retweeting tree according to Section 3.2.4. We adopt
similar parameters as in Section 3.3 by setting M = 3, α = 0.2,
c = 10, and K = 10.
To model the spam campaign, we conduct the experiment
in multiple rounds. In each round, we randomly select one
social bot to publish a spam tweet and other social bots that
have not been suspended to retweet the spam tweet according
to the retweeting forest. We assume that the legitimate users
retweet the spam occasionally with probability β. At the end
of each round, we update the spam scores for each bot and
legitimate user according to Eq. (2). If sv ≥ 1 for some user
v, we remove v from the simulated network. We then start
the next round by randomly selecting a bot as the new source
and continue the spam distribution. To reduce the randomness,
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Fig. 9. Performance Comparison.
we repeat each experiment 100 times and report the average
results.
We evaluate the proposed defense in comparison with three
other baseline defenses as follows.
• Defense I. The original defense that suspends the users
in the first M levels from the spam source, which is
considered by the attacker to launch the optimal spam
distribution as discussed in Section 3.2.
• Defense II. Any user who retweets δ spams is sus-
pended, regardless of its distance to the spam source,
where δ is a system parameter.
• Defense III. Assume that user v has retweeted a spam
tweet t within M hops from the source and that t has
been retweeted by nt users in total. The spam score for
v is updated as
sv = sv + 1/ log(1 + nt) .
Defense III extends Defense I and II by taking the
popularity of individual spam tweet into account. The
intuition is that the more users retweet a spam tweet,
the more deceiving the spam tweet, and the less likely
that any individual user who retweets it is a bot. We also
use the system parameter δ as the suspending threshold
for this defense scheme.
• Defense IV. The proposed defense.
We use four metrics to compare the proposed defense
with the three baseline defenses. Let Nbots and Nlegit be the
numbers of social bots and legitimate users, respectively. Also
let Sbots and Slegit be the numbers of suspended social bots
and legitimate users, respectively. We define the following four
metrics.
• True positive rate (TPR): the ratio of the suspended
bots over the total bots, which can be computed as
Sbots/Nbots. This metric is also referred to as recall.
• False positive rate (FPR): the ratio of suspended legit-
imate users over all the legitimate users, which can be
computed as Slegit/Nlegit.
• Precision: the ratio of suspended bots over all sus-
pended users, which can be computed as Sbots/(Slegit +
Sbots).
• Overall performance: TPR − P · FPR where P is the
penalty parameter for FPR.
We adopted overall performance here because FPR has much
larger impact than TPR from the service provider’s point of
view, as suspending a legitimate user damages its reputation
and incurs severer consequences than a social bot evading
detection.
Fig. 8 shows the true positive and false positive rates with
different γs which are the attenuation factors of distance. As
we can see, the proposed defense could quickly detect all the
social bots when γ is large. Specifically, when γ = 0.9, all
the social bots can be detected and suspended in the second
round. Moreover, as expected, the ratio of true suspension at
the same round will decrease as γ decreases. Finally, there is
an anticipated tradeoff between false and true positive rates for
different γs. The larger γ, the higher true positive rate but also
the higher false positive rate, and vice versa. In the following
experiments, we set γ = 0.7 by default.
Fig. 9 compares the proposed defense with the three base-
lines under different βs, i.e., the probability of a legitimate user
retweeting a spam tweet. We can make five observations here.
First, Fig. 9(a) shows that β has no impact on the TPR, but
Fig. 9(b) shows that the larger β, the higher FPR for all four
defenses, which is consistent with the definition of β. Second,
Fig. 9(a) shows that Defense II has the highest TPR = 100% in
every round. The reason is that when δ = 1.0 all the social bots
will be suspended after the first round. Defense IV has the
second highest TPR and needs about five rounds to approach
100%. Defense I and III both have lower TPR because they only
examine the users in the firstM = 3 levels instead of the whole
network. Third, Fig. 9(b) shows that the FPR of the proposed
defense is lower than those of Defenses I and II but slightly
higher than that of Defense III. This is because Defense I and
II have much less restrict conditions for suspending users than
Defense IV. Fourth, Fig. 9(c) shows that Defenses IV and
III have the precision close to 100% after the first and sixth
rounds, respectively, as they both incur low false positives and
sufficiently high true positives. Defense III has 0% of precision
before the sixth round because it did not suspend any social
bot in the first five rounds. In contrast, both Defense I and II
have relatively low precision because they misclassified many
normal users as bots. Finally, Fig. 9(d) shows that the proposed
defense has better overall performance than all three baselines
with penalty factor P varying from 10 to 10000. The reason is
that Defense IV has much lower FPR than Defense I and II
and higher TPR than Defense III. In summary, the proposed
defense outperforms all three baselines as it can effectively
detect social bots while being friendly to legitimate users.
5.2 Defense against Digital-influence Manipulation
As discussed in Section 4, all the digital-influence software
vendors consider the number of actions and/or the audience
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Fig. 10. The performance under the random attack.
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Fig. 11. The performance under the seed-targeting attack.
TABLE 2
Four action networks for evaluation, where ’F’ and ’I’ refer to following and
interaction, respectively.
Area #Users #F-edges #I-edges (#Weights)
Tucson (TS) 28,161 830,926 162,333 (669,006)
Philadelphia (PI) 144,033 5,462,013 1,434,375 (4,972,689)
Chicago (CI) 318,632 14,737,526 3,631,469 (12,010,986)
Los Angeles (LA) 300,148 18,333,774 4,391,542 (14,048,838)
size as the major factors in evaluating a user’s digital-influence,
which makes them vulnerable to the social botnet. To address
this vulnerability, we propose a new digital-influence measure-
ment scheme inspired by [45]. The key idea is to find sufficient
credible users and only use the actions from them to compute
digital-influence scores for other users. Specifically, given a
social network with user set V and all the actions (including
following, retweeting, mentioning, and replying) among the
users, we first find a subset V ∗ ⊆ V of users that are credible.
We then define the digital-influence score of each user v
based on the actions from the credible user set V ∗. Specifically,
assume that user v has received aj actions from each user j ∈
V ∗. The digital influence score for v is then given by as
score(v) =
∑
j∈V ∗
f(aj) (3)
where
f(aj) =
{
aj if aj = 0, 1,
1 + λ · exp(− 1aj ) else,
(4)
and λ is a system parameter that represents the maximum
impact of actions from a single user on one’s score. In practice,
we can set λ = 1 such that a single user could contribute
the score by at most 2. It is easy to see that the above score
definition takes both the number of actions and the audience
size into account, which captures the key ideas behind Klout,
Kred, Retweet Rank scores as well our findings in Section 4.2.
The challenge is then how to find the credible user set V ∗.
To tackle this challenge, we observe that although the actions
among the social bots and from the social bots to the legiti-
mate users are unpredictable, legitimate users usually carefully
choose whom to interact, so there are much fewer actions from
legitimate users to social bots. Based on this observation, we
first find a small number of trusted users, which could either be
the verified users maintained by Twitter or manually verified.
We then assign each trusted user some initial credits and
distribute the credits along the action edges in multiple rounds.
In each round, every user with credits keeps one unit of
credit for himself and distributes the remaining credits to
his neighbors along the action edges. The credit distribution
process terminates when no user has extra credits to distribute.
Since legitimate users are more likely to receive credits than
social bots during the process, every user who has received at
least one unit of credit is considered credible.
More specifically, we first construct an action graph for
credit distribution. Given the user set V and all their actions
during the period T , we build a weighted and directed action
graph G = (V,E), where each user corresponds to a vertex in
V , and there is an arc eij from user i to user j an edge with
the weight wij if user i has retweeted, replied, or mentioned
user j for wij times during the period T . We do not consider
the following action because it has been reported that normal
users could carelessly follow back whoever has followed them
[14], [15].
We then design a credit distribution scheme on G = (V,E),
which consists of seeds selection, initial credit assignment,
iterative credit distribution, and termination. To initiate credit
distribution, we first select a seed set S from V which are
trusted users such as the verified users maintained by Twitter
or manually verified, and partition the whole graph into a
tree of multiple levels, in which the seed users occupy the
first level, their one-hop outgoing neighbors occupy the second
level, and so on. A node is assigned to the highest level if its
incoming neighbors appear at different levels. We then assign
each seed s with the amount of credits proportional to the sum
of weights of its outgoing edges, i.e., wo(s)Ctotal/
∑
s∈S wo(s),
where Ctotal is the total amount of initial credits, and wo(s) is
the sum of weights of the seed s’s all outgoing edges. We then
distribute the credit from the seed users along the tree level by
level. Specifically, if a user v at the nth level has c(v) units of
credit, he holds one unit of credit for himself and distributes
the remaining c(v)− 1 units of credit to its outgoing neighbors
at the (n+ 1)th level, where the amount of credits received by
neighbor v′ is proportional to the edge weight evv′ . In other
words, neighbor v′ receives wvv′(c(v) − 1)/
∑
u∈O(v)wvu units
of credits. The credits could only be distributed from one level
to the immediate higher level and are rounded to the closest
integer. The credit distribution terminates if none of the nodes
has any extra credit to distribute to its outgoing neighbors.
The choice of Ctotal represents the tradeoff between true
and false positive rates. On the one hand, with a larger
Ctotal, we could discover more credible users and compute
digital-influence scores for more legitimate users at the cost
of more social bots obtaining credits and being labelled as
credible users. On the other hand, a smaller Ctotal will result
in fewer credible users being discovered as well as fewer
social bots being labelled as credible users. As in [46], we set
Ctotal = O(
√|V |) to strike a good balance between true and
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false positive rates. The idea is that at the end of credit distribu-
tion, approximately Ctotal users will each hold one unit of credit
and be labelled as credible. If we set Ctotal = O(
√|V |) and
the interaction graph is well-connected, with high probability
there exists at least one arc from some credible users to each
of the |V | users while the credit distribution will terminate in
O(log |V |) levels with decreasing credits per arc such that each
attack arc from legitimate users to social bots is expected to
receive only O(1) of credits [46].
5.2.1 Evaluation
We follow the approach taken by [47]–[49] to evaluate the
performance of the digital-influence measurement scheme.
Specifically, we first use the Twitter geo-search API [50] to
collect the users in a specific metropolitan area and then crawl
the latest 600 tweets of each user to extract the interactions such
as retweets, replies, and mentions. We create four datasets from
the four representative area in U.S. as shown in Table 2.
For each dataset, we build one ground-truth network com-
posed of both legitimate users and social botnets. Specifically,
we first build one legitimate action subgraph from the interac-
tions among the legitimate users in the that area, where each
vertex corresponds with one legitimate user, and an edge from
one user to another corresponds to interaction from the former
to the latter. We further create a completely-connected social
botnet with the same number of social bots as the legitimate
users. We then construct a ground-truth network by connecting
the legitimate action subgraph and the social botnet with a
number of attack edges from legitimate action subgraph to the
social botnet. Here we assume that there is no edge from the
social botnet to the legitimate action subgraph, which is clearly
in favor of the social bots, as the social bots would only lose
credits through such edges.
The attack edges are constructed in the following way.
Assuming that there are total g edges in the legitimate action
subgraph, we create ωg attack edges with unit weight, where
ω is the ratio representing attack strength. As in [49], we vary
the ω from 10−5 to 10−4 of the total edges in each legitimate
subgraph. We use ground-truth networks to conduct the credit
distribution and find the credible user subset V ∗.
As in [48], we consider two types of attacks. In the random
attack, we randomly choose ωg legitimate users and connect
each of them to one randomly chosen social bot with an
attack edge. In this case, the attacker is unaware of which
users are seed. In the seed-targeting attack, we create ωg attack
edges between the social botnet and ωg users randomly chosen
from 100ωg legitimate users with shortest distances to the
seeds. This type of attack mimics the case that the attacker
tries to acquire positions close to the seed users to gain more
credits during credit distribution. For both attacks, we assume
that the social botnet can arbitrarily distribute received credits
internally. For example, suppose that the social botnet receives
Cbots credits after the credit distribution, they distribute these
credits to Cbots social bots each with one credit, such that all
Cbots bots become credible users.
We evaluate the performance of the proposed digital-
influence measurement scheme using the following metrics.
• Top-K-percent accuracy. Let U1 be the list of legitimate
users ranked by their total numbers of incoming inter-
actions. Also let U2 be the list of legitimate users ranked
by their digital influence scores obtained by applying
the proposed digital-influence measurement scheme to
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Fig. 12. The impact of K on the top-K-percent accuracy.
the ground-truth network. Further let U1(K) and U2(K)
be the top-K-percent users in U1 and U2, respectively.
The top-K-percent accuracy is defined as |U1(K)∩U2(K)||U1(K)| .
The more accurate of the proposed scheme, the higher
the ratio of common users in these two top-K lists, and
vice versa.
• Social-bot influence ranking. Let bot b be the bot with the
highest digital influence score output by the proposed
digital-influence measurement scheme. Social-bot influ-
ence ranking is defined as b’s rank in percentile in U1.
The lower the bot’s percentile, the higher resilience to
the social botnet, and vice versa.
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show the top-10-percent accuracy and
the social-bot influence ranking under two types of attacks with
attack strength varying from 10−5 to 10−4. In general, we
see similar trend in all scenarios for all the four datasets,
meaning that the results are consistent across different datasets.
Moreover, in all cases, the accuracy is always larger than
70%, meaning that the proposed digital-influence measure-
ment scheme can discover 70% of top-10% influential users
under the social botnet attack. We can also see in Fig. 10(a)
and Fig. 11(a) that the the accuracy is insensitive to the change
of attack strength. The reason is that the top influential users
attract actions from many legitimate users, who have higher
chances to acquire the credits and become credible users in the
presence of attack edges. In contrast, as shown in in Fig. 10(b)
and Fig. 11(b), the social-bot influence ranking increases as the
attack strength increases under both types of attacks. This is
expected, because as attack strength increases, more social bots
will acquire credits to become credible users and affect target
bots’ influence scores. We can also see from Figs. 10(b) and
11(b) that the social-bot influence ranking is below top 40% and
top 20% under the random attack and seed-targeting attack,
respectively.
Fig. 10(b) and Fig. 11(b) also compare the proposed defense
with the existing influence measurement vendor Kred.10 As
we can see, the bot’s influence score could always rank at the
first position because we assumed that there are infinite actions
between any two bots in the botnet. In contrast, the proposed
scheme could effectively defend against the manipulation from
social botnets.
Fig. 12 shows the impact of K on the top-K-percent accu-
racy, which generally increases until to 100% when K increases
from 10 to 100. Overall, the accuracy is higher than 70% in the
10. we choose Kred because only Kred has publish its influence score
model on http://kred.com/rules.
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figures, and K = 10 in previous experiments is representative
among the worst cases.
In summary, experiment results show that the proposed
digital-influence measurement scheme is resilient to the social
botnet attack.
6 RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss the prior work tightly related to our
work in this paper.
The social botnet has received attention only recently. Fer-
rara et al. summarized the research on social bots in [2].
Boshmaf et al. showed that a social botnet is very effective
in connecting to many random or targeted Facebook users
(i.e., large-scale infiltration) [4]. The work in [6], [28] shows
how the spammers become smarter to embed themselves into
Twitter. Messias et al. used two sicalbots to manipulate the
Klout and Twitalyzer scores by following and tweeting actions
[27]. Our preliminary work [1] was independently done from
[27] and shows how social bots could cooperate to manipulate
the influence scores of Klout, Kred, and Retweet Rank.
There is a rich literature on spam detection in OSNs. The
first line of work such as [12], [25], [31]–[36], [51], [52] considers
independent spam bots and comes up with different methods
to characterize and detect them. For example, Song et al. found
that the distance between the sender and receiver of a message
is larger for spammers than legitimate users [33]. Zhang et al.
found that automated spammers usually show some temporal
pattern which can be used for detection [35]. Another features
and the corresponding machine learning effort can be found in
[12], [25], [31], [32], [34], [36], [51], [52]. Some of these results
such as [33] have been incorporated into our design constraints
in § 3.2.2.
The second line of work such as [7]–[9], [14], [15], [24]
focuses on characterizing and detecting organized spam cam-
paigns launched by an army of spam bots. We discover a new
method for effective spam campaign in this paper, and whether
the results in [7]–[9], [14], [15], [24] can be directly or adapted
to detect our method is certainly challenging and worthy
of further investigation. Moreover, spam bots are evolving
towards more intelligence. Yang et al. found that instead of
separate communities, spam bots embedded themselves into
the network by building small-world-like networks between
them and also maintaining tight links with external legitimate
users [14]. Meanwhile, Ghosh et al. discovered the similarly
rich connections between spam bots and the legitimate users
[15]. Our work is consistent with this trending and explore the
new attacks by using the spam bots’ growing intelligence.
There are effective solutions such as [46]–[48], [53]–[55]
to detecting Sybil accounts in distributed systems under the
control of a single attacker. These solutions commonly assume
that the link between two accounts corresponds to a real
social relationship difficult to establish and impossible to forge.
Moreover, all of these system assume that the connection is
undirected. In this paper, we designed the defense scheme for
directed and weighted Twitter network by using the similar
observation that the amount of interactions from a legitimate
user to a social bot is usually far less than that in the reverse
direction in § 5.2. We also found that using the interaction
network yields better defense performance than the following
networks. Although § 5.2 has illustrate an example by using the
trustworthiness of interactions to defend against the specific
digital-influence manipulation attack, we can use the same
observation but different methods to identify the social botnets
and then eliminate them from the microblogging system.
Also related is the research on computing the digital influ-
ence score [17], [18], [56]. For example, Cha et al., compared
three influence ranking lists in Twitter by counting the num-
ber of retweets, mentions and followers and found that the
influenced defined by the number of followers is very different
with the other two metrics [17]. Bakshy et al. [56] proposed to
measure user influence based on his ability to post the tweets
that generates a cascade of retweets. This line of research does
not consider the impact of the social botnet.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we firmly validated the efficacy and merits of
botnet-based spam distribution and digital-influence manip-
ulation on Twitter through thorough experiments and trace-
driven simulations. We also propose the countermeasures cor-
responding to these two attacks and demonstrate their effec-
tiveness.
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